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The Arab Intifada: Split divides Turkish Sunnism, Iranian Shiism

8 May 2013 - 17:44


[caption id="attachment_27519" align="alignright" width="300"] A Muslim man prays inside a new mosque in Rijeka, May 4, 2013. This is the first mosque built in the Croatian Adriatic city since the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, according to local Muslims.[/caption]
Generations of Arabs were raised on hatred of Turkey, thanks to the legacy of the heavy yoke of Turkish imperialism. The situation was not much different vis-a-vis the Iran of the shahs, albeit for different reasons; in Iran’s case, the present of the 1950s and 1960s had the same effect as Turkey’s remote past.
Turkey’s turn as an imperial power endured for a long period of time, such that the passage of time wore away at the Islamic slogans that camouflaged it at first. "The Sultan" came to overpower "the Caliph," displacing the latter from history, geography, and practical politics. "Ottomanism" — and worse, "Turkification" — assumed the substance of Turkey’s chosen policy. And its cruelest applications, some of which bordered on the monstrous, were reserved especially for the Arabs and Muslims.

It was easy, then, for the European colonizers who came to inherit the legacy of the Sultans after World War I to redraw the maps of the wider Arab world whose identity had been deliberately effaced over the course of the centuries. Here Sharif Hussein [of Mecca] found an open field to declare himself an Arab Caliph, wielding his sword in the Hijaz in an attempt to claim the position of "King of the Arabs." Wrapping himself in the mantle of his noble descent, he left his son Faisal to inherit the throne of Syria, reserving dominion of Transjordan for his son, the emir Abdullah. This lay the groundwork for the Sykes-Picot Agreement that was to follow. It was replete with plans for dividing up the region, the gravest being the Balfour Declaration, which may have paved the way for the establishment of a Jewish state upon the land of Palestine.

Faisal I proved unable to maintain his kingdom in Syria, his fledgling army defeated by the French at the gates of Damascus. He was then picked up by the British, who established him as the King of Iraq. His kingdom was established after a lengthy bargaining process concerning the map of this newly fashioned entity, which concluded in Mosul’s separation from Syria and its annexation by Iraq.

Then, on the eve of World War II, the French found themselves in need of appeasing Turkey. So they lopped off part of Syria’s territory: Kilikia, Adana, and Iskanderun. This strip of territory — which in Syria became known as “the stolen province” — contains the city of Antakya, considered holy by Orthodox Christians as well as by Eastern Christians generally.

The Shah’s Iran was not much better in its dealings with the Arabs than was Turkey. It is no secret that the Persians under the Shah’s leadership did not look toward the Arabs with respect generally. On the contrary, they looked down upon them from the heights of their “empire.” Yet they never forgot that these "bedouin" once crushed their vast kingdom, bringing down their empire through the power of the summons to Islam and the emissaries of the religion of divine guidance, human dignity and the Noble Quran.

Thus when the Arabs found the path to launching a revolution, they found themselves once again confronting their two historic rivals: the Turks and the Iranians. That is, before the West generated their new, powerful enemy: Israel.

When revolution erupted in Egypt on July 23, 1952, the rivals and enemies of Arabism did not wait long before attacking them and attempting to put them under siege, particularly since its echo began to resound a note of challenge from one end of the Arab world to the other — in Arab North Africa no less than in the Arab East. In this manner Israel was driven to attack Egypt — sometimes by planting bombs in certain facilities, at other times by undertaking assassinations and attempting to mobilize the issue of Jews within Egypt.

The climax came in the Tripartite invasion of the fall of 1956, under the pretext of the revolutionary decision (under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser) to nationalize the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956.

It is no secret that Turkey and the Shah’s Iran both supported the Tripartite invasion in both its declared goals and its covert objectives. The latter were the more dangerous of the two, since they sought to restore imperial dominion over all of the Arab lands that had nearly found their way to freedom. Israel was the "fighting vanguard," so to speak, while the Turkey-Iran bloc constituted the political backing. They justified the assault’s goals and defended its results.

The countries involved in the Tripartite invasion did not hesitate to fall in line under American leadership, which benefited from its record in opposing and condemning that aggression, to call for the formation of the Baghdad Alliance. It was to include the United States, Great Britain, and Iraq under the leadership of the Hashemite King Faisal II, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Egypt would thus be encircled (and along with it Syria, which had supported Egypt in gratitude for revolutionary Egypt’s solidarity with Syria when Turkey massed its forces along the [Turkish-Syrian] borders in the fall of 1957) by an "Islamic" alliance that included some of the largest and relatively most powerful Islamic nations (all of whom, you will notice, were non-Arab).

Could one regard the history of this alliance, coming as it did after the Tripartite invasion against Egypt directly, as the key Western step taken in the direction of putting in place political Islam in Turkey and Iran to combat the authentic identity of our region (namely: Arabism)?

For history is a witness that never perishes. Attempts to stir up a war between Arabism and Islam are nothing new. The confrontations we witness today between these two integral components of the Arab nation’s [or al-Ummah al-Arabiyyah] sentiment is nothing but an invitation to a battle that has been ongoing since the beginning of the 20th century. It is accompanied by an overt desire to erase the massive change that took Iran out of the anti-Arab camp and moved it into its current position, which some see as a triumph for Islam over Persian nationalism, even as others believe it to be a cover for the old Persian condescension camouflaged in Islamic garb. If this accusation is insufficient to condemn the current “Iranian expansionism” then one simply adds the word “Shiite” on top of it, in order to separate Iran’s (Shiite) Islam from the (Sunni) form of Islam embraced by most Muslims.

On the other side, some are actively attempting to portray the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey as a corrective and progressive revolution within the Islamic faith, succeeding in building a successful, modern government capable of building an economically progressive and politically astute state. As evidence, they point out the fact that Turkey’s membership in the NATO alliance has not prevented the Muslim Brotherhood from ascending to power, and that its status as a NATO member and a major American military base, as well as its enduring and strong alliance with Israel (which is not subject to changing heads of state) has not affected its friendship with the Arabs!

It is self-evident that every major power in this region harbors its own political ambitions and "expansionist" tendencies, all the more so in light of the tremendous political vacuum facing the Arab uprisings. That vacuum has thrown them into confusion and caused them to lose sight of their goals, creating an opening for the United States and some European countries to once again assert their presence — nay, to reinforce their presence. Particularly so since the new rulers are working around the clock to emphasize their need for aid and assistance — materially and politically — so as to justify their remaining within the orbit of American influence.

One of these emerging justifications [is the perceived need to] confront the imperialist tendency of the Iranian velayet-e faqih, which has almost taken over the Arab East, beginning in Lebanon (Hezbollah), passing through Syria (the Assad regime), continuing through Iraq (the Maliki government) as well as pockets in Bahrain and Yemen and concluding in various parts of Africa.

Here, too, one might also speak of an American-Iranian bargain that has permitted Tehran to extend its influence into Iraq such that afterward, one might speak of "Persian hegemony" in a Shiite veil in the land of Harun al-Rashid.

In this simple manner has the plan for freedom and liberation been amended. It now gives absolute priority to "the Shiite threat," which is immeasurably stronger than the 'Persian threat." Iran now takes precedence over Israel, which readily joined the ‘new alliance’ as though it were a guardian of the true faith. And Muslim Brotherhood-led Turkey is now considered the pioneering model of true Islam.

Certainly, the "rule of the mullahs" in Iran (as it is termed by its opponents), seems as if it has come from another era. Moreover it is a fearless "invader," that stresses its Islamic identity even as it holds fast to its particular brand of Shiism and believes that Iran is a great power in the Arab East and therefore ought to have a voice in its affairs.

It is understood as well that the campaign against post-revolutionary Iran would grow more fierce among the Arabs — especially among the Gulf countries that once made obeisance to the Shah — who view it as a new Persian imperial power in sectarian guise. As for Muslim Brotherhood-led Turkey, America is its great friend, especially now that it has been liberated from its close ties to Bashar al-Assad [which were once so close] that the Syrian regime abandoned its irredentist discourse about Iskanderun province. The Syrian opposition has done the same, taking the ‘stolen province’ as a base of operations from which to attack the regime in Damascus.

The tragedy here is the absence of the Arabs. It has expanded the margin of influence for any power aspiring to a hegemonic position, [to intervene] under the banner of ‘filling the void’ and defending their interests. Even by pretending to defend both minorities and the true faith.

Alas, the excuses currently being proffered to confront Iran and its ambitions take refuge in the weapon of sectarianism, yet harbor no qualms about allying with Israel. Or, at least, about dropping their hostility to Israel.

One notes, if only for the sake of recollection, that the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, as well as most Arab rulers, welcomed the Shah in his time. Nay, they went so far as to submit to his influence directly, viewing him as a "modern Khosrow"! Yet today, they see in Iran only its Shiism, ignoring its Islamic revolution, skirting over the reasons for [their] weakness, which has limited their choices to one of two foreign powers. As if they are no one! As if they are outside of this world.

By Al-Monitor

 

The Iran Project is not responsible for the content of quoted articles.


Story Code: 27518

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